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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA – THE ART
OF PEACE SUPPORTS U.S. INTERESTS

BY

MR. INSUNG OAKS LEE

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ABSTRACT

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The threat of North Korea resorting to armed conflict if driven to isolation continues to loom over Northeast Asia. South Korea, although having an imminent concern in this state of affairs, remains at odds with the North and peaceful reconciliation seems unlikely. The U.S. may be in a more amicable position to seek peace through nonconfrontational means, prevent armed conflict, and facilitate a lasting peace, thereby bringing stability to the region. This process requires U.S. commitment to help resolve North Korea's dire socio-economic problems and to reduce tension through reciprocal transparent actions. Military confrontation has not achieved peace, but the harmonious process of building trust and confidence may provide ways to advance toward a permanent peace while serving U.S. interests. This paper recommends a nonconfrontational peace strategy called the Crawl, Walk, and Run (CWR) Plan.

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United States Policy Toward North Korea-The Art of Peace Supports
U.S. Interests

"Do not press an enemy at bay... 'Wild beasts, when at bay, fight desperately. How much more is this true of men! If they know there is no alternative, they will fight to the death'."¹

-----Sun Tzu

North and South Korea, like shrimp among whales, continue to be among the world's potential military flash points. To reduce the North Korean threat and to assure North Korean compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States government has attempted in recent years to bring North Korea into the international community.² The U.S. has had several political and military options for dealing with the North Korean regime. However, while maintaining a strong military deterrent force in Korea, the U.S. has opted for gradual engagement through a nonconfrontational resolution of issues, relying on diplomatic efforts, an Art of Peace, to defuse tension, prevent armed conflict in Korea, and perhaps to bring lasting peace and stability to Northeast Asia.³ The Art of Peace, synonymous with "confidence-building measures" (CBM), relies on a nonconfrontational process of openness and trust. Openness enables opposing nations to gain insight into each other's strategic matters and builds mutual trust so that each nation is confident of the other's intentions. If the process is effective, the nations eventually call off their arms races and are no longer suspicious of one another's intentions.⁴ The Art of Peace, then, is a political and diplomatic tool to be used as an instrument to achieve the national objectives (endstate). This paper explores a nonconfrontational strategy of confidence-building measures referred to as the Crawl, Walk, and Run (CWR) Plan as a catalyst

to creating the dignified atmosphere conducive to achieving peace and stability.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

"Korea shall be free and independent in due course."⁵

---1943 Cairo Communiqué

Since the foundation of the Korean nation, Koreans have mistrusted foreigners and thus periodically maintained isolationist policies. The American foreign policies of the 1880's and the subsequent years have made it clear that, to America, Korea is a peripheral interest: the U.S. focused on trade and commerce, as well as Christian missionary efforts. The end of World War II brought the separation of Korea into two ideological camps: Communist North and Democratic South. The division of Korea at the 38th Parallel was the work of two U.S. Army officers assigned to the War Department staff, Colonel Dean Rusk and Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel III, who were assigned to the Operations Division (OPD) of the General Staff. Colonel Rusk was surprised when the dividing line was accepted by the Russians.⁶

The United Nations attempted to bring about a plebiscite for a free and independent nation, but this never materialized. When the Communist surrogate, North Korea, attacked its southern neighbor on 25 June 1950, the Korean Peninsula became a vital interest to U.S. President Truman, fearing Communist world domination, committed combat troops to contain Communist expansion.⁷ Kim Il Sung's decision to unite the divided Korea through use of military force may have been encouraged by America's placement of the Korean Peninsula outside vital U.S.

strategic interests, first declared by the Commander of American Forces in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, in March 1949, and later confirmed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. Acheson consigned Korea, which is part of mainland Asia, as outside of the American defense perimeter:

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.⁸

The U.S., China, the Soviet Union, and both Koreas subsequently paid heavy prices for this conflict and for the implementation of Cold War policies. Over the next 40 years, the 1954 Korean War Armistice Agreement and the U.S. military presence have become the pillars of the fragile cease-fire. With the passing of time and the end of the Cold War, North and South Korea have negotiated an attempt to implement certain confidence-building measures (CBM) to ease the existing tensions. But continuing hostilities prohibit implementation. CBMs are pragmatic actions conceived to build an atmosphere of trust and understanding that impel the opposing parties to cooperate. The purpose of CBMs is:

to generate, between former enemies or between nations in competition, the sense that cooperation is possible and is better than confrontation.... establish the understanding that national interests can still be promoted when acting with another party instead of against it.....foster the feeling that conflict can be avoided if fair steps are taken by both sides....encourage the perception that a win-win strategy is better than a zero-sum game, where the gains of one party are the losses of the other....help one know the opponent, to understand his viewpoint, and provide mutual knowledge that can eventually deflect tensions.⁹

The practical implementation of transparent CBMs in Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the U.S. are credited with bringing the Cold War to a propitious end.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN THE KOREAS

*"If we are not our brother's keeper, let us at least not be his executioner."*¹⁰

Marlon Brando, American actor

From the partition of the Peninsula in 1945 and the war of 1950-53 and through subsequent years, distrust and hatred between the two Koreas continued, creating obstacles to reconciliation. As the Cold War came to an end in Europe, the Koreas met and agreed on December 12, 1991, to implement an "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Mutual Exchanges." On December 31, 1991, a Non-Nuclearization Agreement was signed. The euphoria that generated in the wake of these two agreements was short-lived, however. Because of the failure to implement these two detailed agreements on confidence-building measures, the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).¹¹ To enhance the peace process since then, the U.S., in coordination with the ROK, took the lead in engaging the DPRK government to shape the Korean situation in a manner favorable to regional and global security interests:

America must continue to be an unrelenting force for peace...Taking reasonable risks for peace keeps us from being drawn into far more costly conflicts. It encourages other nations to focus on future hopes, not past hatreds. It creates partners willing to seize the opportunities of a new century.¹²

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA

*"...policy converts the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into a mere instrument."*¹³

---Carl von Clausewitz

Unlike U.S. policies of the pre-1950 era, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 1997 (NSS '97) clearly identifies Northeast Asia as a region where the U.S. has "vital interests." In NSS '97, President Clinton specified "Protecting the security of our nation--our people, our territory and our way of life" as his "foremost mission and constitutional duty."¹⁴ To accomplish this national strategic goal, U.S. policy seeks three core objectives: (1) to enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win; (2) to bolster America's economic prosperity; (3) to promote democracy abroad. The U.S. government plans to achieve these goals with the help of its partners, old and new.¹⁵ Four years ago, President Clinton linked his vision of a new Pacific community to security interests, economic growth, and commitment to democracy and human rights.¹⁶ The new strategy, then, is to build upon his past vision by "...cementing America's role as a stabilizing force in a more integrated Asia Pacific Region."¹⁷ The specific concern for the Korean Peninsula is the on-going tension, which remains the principal threat to the peace and stability of the East Asia region.¹⁸ The NSS '97 clearly defines U.S. strategic interests in Korea:

A peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a non-nuclear peninsula is in our strategic interest...developing bilateral contacts with the North aimed at drawing the North into a set of more normal relations with the region and the rest of the world; and following through on the offer of four-party peace talks among the United States, China, and North and South Korea...
...ensure that an isolated and struggling North Korea does not opt for a military solution to its

problems, and emphasize America's commitment to sharing a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula. At the sametime, we are willing to improve bilateral political and economic ties with the North, commensurate with its continued cooperation to resolve the nuclear issue, engagement in North-South dialogue, continued efforts to recover remains of American servicemen missing since the Korean War, and cessation of its chemical and biological programs and ballistic missile proliferation activities.¹⁹

U.S. ACCOMPLISHMENTS

*"We can chart our future clearly and wisely only when we know the path which has led to the present."*²⁰

---Adali Stevenson

Since the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 1953, the U.S. commitment and a conventional arms build-up along the borders of the Koreas has deterred a major armed conflict. But lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula remain tenuous.

Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea's political, social, and economic conditions have gravely deteriorated. North Korea has been forced to seek global assistance.²¹ During the past few years, the U.S. has seized the diplomatic opportunity to engage the isolated North Korean government through a strategy of "engagement and enlargement."²² Ambassador Robert Gallucci discussed CBMs with North Korea, attempting to persuade them "by showing them American goodwill, by implementing the Agreed Framework, and by means of through other actions to improve relations with North Korea."²³

Through this strategy, the U.S. has relaxed its "no contact with the enemy" policy and has begun to negotiate with the North Korean government in the areas of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology control, and Korean War remains recovery operations. "In 1988, under the Reagan Administration, the U.S. undertook what was termed a 'Modest Initiative' to open the window for greater contact with Pyongyang."²⁴ Since then, bilateral meetings have proved helpful in resolving North Korea's noncompliance with the NPT.

The negotiation process, as expected, has been slow. But a few concessions have been gained through a series of meetings. In 1994, the North signed the historical bilateral Agreed Framework, which specifically addresses North Korea's noncompliance with the NPT. Then in 1996, the U.S. negotiated an agreement with North Korea, similar in concept to the combined U.S.-Vietnam operations, to conduct a joint Korean War remains recovery operation, which could resolve POW/MIA cases from that conflict.²⁵ Compliance with these agreements could eventually lead to a diplomatic relationship with the U.S.²⁶

CONTINUATION OF COLD WAR CONFRONTATION

"Hold your friends close...but hold your enemies closer..."²⁷

----Don Vito Corleone, *The Godfather*

The Cold War ended with the demise of communist nations throughout eastern Europe, including the former communist super power, the Soviet Union. Scholars, futurists, and idealists then predicted the demise of North Korea through absorption, explosion, and/or implosion by 1995 or within a few years thereafter.²⁸ Yet realists warned that this would not happen, because Koreans have experienced hardships beyond any Westerner's comprehension. As a consequence, realists predicted, Koreans would weather their continuing difficulties with or without outside help.

Kim Jong-il assumed North Korean leadership in October 1997 as the General Secretary of the Korean Communist Party. It now appears that he has further strengthened his political power and is expected to prevail over the current crisis and remain in control of the staunch North Korean Communist system for the foreseeable future.²⁹ Since Kim Jong-il's ascension as the leader of North Korea, North Korean policies toward the U.S. and South Korea have remained unchanged. Thus the Cold War between the U.S. and North Korea and between both Koreas continues.

THE COST OF MAINTAINING PEACE

*"To conquer with arms is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make a permanent conquest."*³⁰

---Woodrow Wilson

Modern military technology and the violent intensity of modern warfare would bring devastating effects to the Korean Peninsula, much greater than the effects of the Korean War of 1950-1953. The Korean people suffered 5.3 million casualties at that time, one out of six people. A total of some 10 million families were separated, with most of their factories and agricultural products destroyed, along with over a million homes destroyed. In total, about two million military casualties resulted, with troop casualties including 140,000 U.S. soldiers, 273,000 Republic of Korea (ROK) soldiers, 14,000 United Nations combatants, 620,000 DPRK soldiers, and 910,000 Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) soldiers.³¹

The U.S. government allocates over several hundred million dollars annually to maintain about 37,000 personnel in Korea. The world military expenditures statistics indicate that in 1996 Japan ranked second with per soldier defense expenditures of \$191,076, the U.S. ranked fourth with \$174,593; South Korea ranked 45th with \$19,779; PRC ranked with 100th with \$5,490; and the North Korea, 129th with \$2,858.³² Although North Korea is ranked last among the countries indicated, proportionally it commits more than any country in the world with over 25% of its GNP to military spending. A country with dire economic and social problems cannot continue such expenditures. The resources required to maintain the hostile postures could be diverted to improve the failing economy, as well as to advance a program of

confidence-building measures (CBMs) toward peaceful coexistence. This military budget could then be gradually decreased as the CBM program expands and as the increasing trust and confidence level warrants such action.

THE PRESENT DILEMMA

*"Drown not thyself to save a drowning man."*³³

---Thomas Fuller

Consider this option: If the North Koreans are isolated, the government will collapse. Then the two Koreas will eventually be reunited under the democratic system. The problems associated with German reunification, however, indicate that the South Korean economy, currently under great duress, will not be able to absorb the costs of such a process. The Clinton Administration therefore may have taken steps to prolong the survival of the North Korean regime through diplomatic means. Although the continuing dialogue with the North Korean government has been constructive in maintaining a fragile peace and tenuous security, the residual tensions of the Cold War era still keep the Koreas at arm's length. The peace negotiations are not new: Since the mid 1970's, for instance, North Koreans have proposed bilateral peace negotiations with the U.S. But their proposals have not included the South Korean government.³⁴ Because of their failure to include South Korea, the U.S. has turned down the North's proposals.

In 1996, South Korean President Kim Yong-sam and President William J. Clinton proposed Four-Way (China, North and South Korea, U.S.) peace negotiations. The North Koreans responded reluctantly, but eventually used this venue to seek humanitarian

assistance, especially food, for its famished populace.³⁵ These negotiations are progressing at a slow pace, with no end in sight.³⁶ The highly publicized Four-Way talks in Geneva in December 1997 again met with disappointment for the parties involved: "Pyongyang has declared the meeting in Geneva was disappointing as it did not address the U.S. military withdrawal from south Korea or the time frame for completion of a new peace mechanism."³⁷

Four-Way peace negotiations have always been tedious and slow, due to a combination of disagreements over a few difficult issues with over 40 years of an intentionally reinforced adversarial relationship that continues with the Kim Jong-il regime and possibly North Korea's concern for its survivability.³⁸ As scholar David Steinberg has argued:

The situation in North Korea is one that requires a very clear-eyed view of what North Korea's interests are and what exactly are their capabilities to continue into the future. The core issue remains intact, even with the proposed four-power talks underway. I say that because the real issue is not these talks. We have had talks ad nauseum. Even if the talks come to something, it will not be that important. Nor will they resolve the division that exists today.³⁹

These recent impediments suggest that a fresh approach to the old problem is needed to "jump start" the stalled process.

SHIFTING TO A MORE AGGRESSIVE, YET NON-CONFRONTATIONAL STRATEGY

*"All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means."*⁴⁰

---Chou En-lai

During the past 44 years, efforts of the combined forces of the U.S. and South Korea have provided a credible deterrence, preventing a major armed conflict, and have maintained the fragile peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, continued maintenance of a large deterrent conventional force will be costly to all parties involved, and even with such a deterrent, confrontation is likely.⁴¹

Nonconfrontational relationships may appear to be possible through diplomacy and the Four-Way peace negotiations. But the process has been hindered by several obstacles. The North Koreans insist on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Republic of Korea; the removal of economic sanctions; and a greater amount of food assistance. Before any progress can be made on negotiations, these North Korean demands must be resolved. One of the three demands is currently being met: North Korea is Asia's second largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid, which includes food, fuel oil, and compensation for the recovery of the Korean War remains.⁴² Since the U.S. government is providing foreign aid to North Korea, continuing economic sanctions against that regime is counterproductive. Lifting economic sanctions would provide North Korea with a more flexible trading strategy. With increased trade, the North Koreans should require less U.S. aid.

The most contentious obstacle to success in the reconciliation process has been North Korea's demand for

withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. This strategy may reflect North Korean stalling tactics, perhaps to buy time to further solidify the Kim Jong-il regime or to slowly prepare the population for a more open society. In spite of official North Korean intransigence on this issue, however, there may be groups of North Koreans who do not desire complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula. There are reports that North Korea does not want "the immediate pullout of the American forces from south Korea,"⁴³ and North Korean military and Foreign Ministry personnel have expressed in private to U.S. State Department officials as well as to a visiting U.S. scholar that North Koreans are also concerned about the absence of U.S. troops in Korea and the impact of a withdrawal on the balance of power.⁴⁴

These hints from North Korea give hope that the resolution of the U.S. troop presence in South Korea, and along with cooperative and transparent actions and continuing foreign humanitarian and economic assistance to North Korea, is a means of building confidence and trust between the donors and the receiver. Peaceful coexistence could be achieved through CBMs, allowing both sides to develop trust to overcome the years of hatred, secrecy, and distrust. Emergent trust and friendship can then lead to a cooperative spirit, which in time can establish peace.

Americans are perceived as seekers of quick solutions and demonstrable results. But the CBM process requires patience and perseverance. The stated U.S. national objective is to gain a permanent peace agreement with the North Korean government,⁴⁵ but CBMs implemented through a deliberate "Crawl-Walk-Run" (CWR) approach, a nonconfrontational plan of establishing trust and confidence, have not been seriously tested. With Kim Jong-il

firmly in power and the recent change in leadership of the South Korea which brought President Kim Dae-jung to power, now is the most opportune time to plan for and implement the process. The plan will require a team effort on the part of a myriad of government and non-government organizations down to the grassroots level. This plan includes the establishment of an entire series of interim goals that should not be time-driven.

CRAWL, WALK, RUN (CWR) PLAN TOWARD PEACE AND STABILITY

*"Peace is a daily, a weekly, a monthly process gradually changing opinions, slowly eroding old barriers, quietly building new structures."*⁴⁶

---John F. Kennedy

The following CWR Plan proposes the ways and means to achieve the U.S. goal of establishing permanent peace and stability through building mutual trust and cooperation. Ideally, better relations between North Korea and both the U.S. and South Korea are to be realized. However, current tensions between the North and South preclude such an outcome. Under the CWR Plan, the key to success is the development of better relations through transparency for both the U.S. and the North Korean government. The effectiveness of this program relies upon support from the leaders of the governments involved. The latest encouraging comment came from Kim Jong-il who, upon ascension to power and for the first time since the Korean War, declared that the U.S. is not the enemy of North Korea.⁴⁷ This reconciliation process will encourage North Korea to establish a peaceful relationship with the U.S. and will eventually bring both the North and the South into a cooperative sphere. Reconciliation will be greatly enhanced by the implementation of the CWR Plan, consisting of the three phases: crawl, walk, and run.

CRAWL PHASE: Build trust and confidence by negotiating and maintaining dialogue between government and non-government organizations (NGO), and private organizations in consonance with the North Korean government, thereby establish a better all-around relationship. The most notable example of turning a fragile relationship between adversaries into a trusting relationship is the 1988 invitations to visit to the military installations in the U.S. and the Soviet Union of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, with his Soviet counterpart, Field Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev. Henry Kissinger's diplomatic demarche for President Richard Nixon to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong of the PRC is another example. The expanded relations program should encompass political, economic, military, social/cultural, and sports exchange programs, all of which are integral parts of the confidence-building Crawl Phase.

Political: The political part of the Crawl Phase includes executing negotiated resolutions such as the Agreed Framework, the POW/MIA accountability agreement, food aid, and other humanitarian and NGO programs. The U.S. should continue to negotiate contentious issues into workable solutions, such as the curtailment of weapons of mass destruction, as well as curbing export of missile systems. Since the North Korean government obtains hard currency through exporting military hardware, a viable compensation solution will be required if North Korea is to be persuaded to desist from such activities. Promotion of and participation in regional security forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NACD), and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) need to be strongly encouraged, as should reciprocal visit programs for government officials from the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government. A

U.S. Liaison Office that provides protection to U.S. citizens traveling in North Korea and supports other U.S. interests should be established as soon as possible.

Economic: The U.S. should ease economic sanctions in order to expand U.S. business opportunities in North Korea and provide North Korea the flexibility required to improve their poor economic situation. The North's poor economic conditions drive their continuing dependence on foreign aid. Continuing reliance on foreign assistance is a temporary solution to the current problem. The advent of a vibrant North Korean economy built upon an export/free-market model, however, could lead the country to economic recovery and less dependence on foreign aid. The North Koreans need to be invited to participate in various training opportunities to learn about the free-market oriented economic system. The assistance is also required for the North Korean government and corporations to gain entry into the international market.

Military: The military part of the Crawl Phase could include inviting the North Koreans to observe combined ROK and U.S. military exercises on a reciprocal basis; initiating naval port-calls; conducting combined humanitarian projects; inviting North Korea to participate in the U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM's) multinational military conferences such as the Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS); and establishing and planning regional military conferences to meet periodically to exchange transparent military information. Other measures could include establishing a security assistance program similar to the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to support the conferences and the training needs of the participating nations and establishing a "hot-line" communications system for mutual notification of pending military

exercises or other actions which may impact or alarm the other government. Transparency is essential to establish better understanding; better communication can enhance the process.

Social/Cultural: This part of the Crawl Phase might include encouraging North Korean participation in cultural exchanges such as grassroots exchanges; people-to-people visits; Korean War veterans and families visits; religious conferences; media/communications training conferences; international organization conferences; and various social and cultural conferences; academic conferences; teacher and student exchanges; technology exchange conferences; environmental conferences; science conferences; agricultural conferences and other social/cultural exchanges. Such interactions can directly impact on U.S. and North Korean relationships.

Sports: Sports activities have been used as a diplomatic tool to expand friendly relationships with former adversaries. This area could include various bilateral or multilateral sports games and exchanges involving nations having direct security interests in the region. This type of activity provides a non-threatening environment in which to build a basis for a continuing friendship between two or more adversaries; ie., the U.S./PRC "ping-pong" diplomacy.

WALK PHASE: During this phase, a friendlier and more cooperative relationship among the DPRK, U.S., China, and the ROK will be developed. The U.S. and ROK will have to sustain the on-going programs and activities identified in the Crawl Phase by continuing to negotiate and maintain a government-to-government dialogue with the North. The key to NGO success depends highly upon the degree of support provided by the North Korean government. They may be encouraged to provide such support

because the flow of NGO and private organizations resources will greatly benefit North Korea. Thus an expanded cordial relationship can be realized. The ways and means to accomplish this phases include, but are not limited to, political, economic, military, social/cultural, and sports programs.

Political: If the first phase is successful, the four parties may be able to negotiate a permanent peace agreement to replace the Korean War Armistice Agreement. This agreement should include phased American troop withdrawal in consonance with reciprocal North Korean actions, arms and force reductions of both North and South, and mutual inspections. As long as the Koreas are divided, the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in Korea is not recommended. If the Korean people desire a continuing U.S. military presence, the U.S. should oblige. International, United Nations, or multinational peace and security monitoring forces may be established to monitor and enforce the peace agreement. The U.S. should also encourage and support various regional security forums consisting of China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia, and the U.S. A summit should be initiated with the national leaders to provide a positive vision for the future of Northeast Asia. One of the important items on the U.S agenda for this meeting should be to upgrade U.S./DPRK diplomatic relationship to ambassadorial level.

Economic: In this phase, the U.S. might provide grants and scholarship programs for North Koreans to attend U.S. schools to gain technical knowledge and to introduce them to democratic principles and market-oriented economics. North Korean GNP for the past several years has declined. In order to revitalize the faltering economy, a considerable amount of foreign assistance and technical knowledge must be provided. Financial support in the forms of grants, low-interest loans, and credits from the

major economic powers throughout the world and the assistance from 15 members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum may be the key to the economic recovery. For the long range U.S. regional security interest, the U.S. may ultimately need to provide them with an economic recovery plan similar to the Marshall Plan in order to bolster and ameliorate the faltering North Korean economy.

Military: The U.S. should continue to plan and expand the military-to-military exchange program to include mid-level, junior officer, and non-commissioned officer exchange programs; combined military exercises focused on such operations as combined humanitarian missions; and a security assistance program.

Social/Cultural/Sports: The programs identified in the Crawl Phase should be expanded with the incorporation of other related initiatives.

RUN PHASE: By now a full diplomatic relationship will have been established, with an amicable relationship between the U.S. and North Korea as a result. The initial peace settlement will likely form North and South Korea into one Korea with two separate systems of governance, since the ideologies of the two governing systems are so diametrically opposed. In the evolutionary process, the two systems are likely to be merged to form one system of governance.

China, Japan, and Russia, for security interests, may well like to see the Korean peninsula maintain this divided status, with U.S. and/or United Nations/multinational peacekeeping forces deployed. A united Korea with an alliance with the U.S. could be perceived as a military threat by China and Russia. However, the

absence of U.S. forces in a united Korea might also bring instability to the region, if a united Korea is seen as a military competitor or if Korea sees its old enemy Japan as a resurgent military power.

In the Run Phase, all parties will have to sustain on-going programs and activities identified in the Crawl and Walk phases. The DPRK government will reap the greatest benefits from phasing into the export market economy and participating in expanded economic, political, and cultural relationships with other nations, becoming a respected member of the international community.

BOLD ACTION REQUIRED FOR PEACE

"The barrier of distrust that has been between us during the last thirty years has been broken down in thirty-five hours. Amazing! Really!"⁴⁸

---Anwar Sadat

The U.S. government should abandon its "business as usual" approach and boldly implement the Art of Peace by means of the Crawl-Walk-Run Plan. As stated in NSS '97, "America must continue to be an unrelenting force for peace..." and accordingly take the initiatives, such as this proposed plan, to shape and fulfill the strategy. If successful, these nonconfrontational confidence-building measures will ease North Korea into the international community.

Recently taking office, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung has expressed his desire to meet with the North Korean leader as a step toward reconciliation. If the two Kims decide to meet and reconcile, this event could set the precedent for establishing a permanent peace comparable to Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel which

resulted in a permanent peace agreement. Even with this type of scenario, the proper execution of the CWR Plan will become more crucial to overcome the difficulties associated with the years of hatred and mistrust. But the South Korean government decides not to participate, then the U.S. government may, in pursuit of its national and global interests, have to go it alone initially. The economic instability of both Koreas and the possible scenarios of sudden collapse of the North Korean regime will be costly not only to the Koreas, but to the world economy. Through the execution of the confidence-building measures of the CWR process and with the support of continuing negotiations, a North Korean collapse may be averted and a permanent peace agreement may eventually be realized.

CONCLUSION

"Today the United States has a unique historical opportunity to foster peace through preventive defense. As preventive medicine creates the conditions that support health, making disease less likely and surgery unnecessary, so preventive defense creates the conditions that support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary."⁴⁹

---William J. Perry

Now is the time for the U.S. government to actively engage the Kim Jong-il government in furtherance of achieving permanent peace with North Korea as outlined in the National Security Strategy of 1997. The possible collapse of the North Korean regime and the worldwide economic dilemma associated with such a scenario should prompt the U.S. to pursue bold initiative to shape and steer a future that will be advantageous not only to both Koreas and the U.S., but to the world community. Poor

economic performance and continued famine without international assistance will plague the North Korean people and threaten the regime's survival. These dire conditions may be the reasons why the North is not too eager to engage in various CBMs, including Four-Party talks, but to use this opportunity to seek external assistance. Through the Crawl, Walk, and Run Plan, the U.S. can effectively persuade North Korea to cooperate in various diplomatic and other CBMs to ameliorate the faltering North Korean economy and allow the DPRK exert itself as a respectable member of the international community. As the CWR Plan progresses, North Korea may be expected to reciprocate by abandoning its belligerent polices toward the U.S. and opting for a peace settlement. Implementation of the CWR Plan should soften North Korea's suspicions about U.S. intentions and eventually enable the North to retreat from its hard-line stance against the U.S. and South Korea. One difficult U.S. task is to convince the North Koreans that the U.S. is not interested in the demise of the Kim Jong-il regime: the CWR Plan has the ingredients to successfully persuade them.

The CWR Plan is one of many forms of preventive defense, a proven methodology of making use of a peace process rather than war to convince the North Korean leaders that permanent peace can be achieved through peaceful means. The key to lasting peace and security on the Korean Peninsula remains with the United States

government. Mutual trust and cooperation shared among the Koreans and the Americans fostered by the Art of Peace process may yield a permanent peace.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 110. Sun Tzu quotes Prince FuCh'ai: "Wild beasts, when at bay...fight to the death."

² Charles Kartman, "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea," linked from "Department of State," 26 February 1997; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/ea./970226_kartman_north_korea.html>; Internet; accessed 17 November 1997.

³ William J. Perry, "Preventive Defense," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996, 64-79.

⁴ Ibid., 70.

⁵ Andrew C. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation-A History of the Korean People, (Seoul, Hollym Corporation, 1988), 329.

⁶ Donald W. Boose, Jr., "Portentous Sideshow: The Korean Occupation Decision," Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Winter 1995-96, 118-119; Warren I. Cohen, Dean Rusk, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Volume 19, (Totowa: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980), 4; Joseph C. Goulden, "Shrimp Crushed In Battle of Whales," KOREA, The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books, 1982), 19; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, (New York: Viking Press, 1987), 442; John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War responsible for military occupation and civil affairs directed Rusk and Bonesteel to draw a line as far north as possible to include Seoul, the capital and the 38th parallel was recommended as the new boundary. Colonel Donald W. Boose, Jr., U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA provided the following information: Rusk and Bonesteel's recommendation was approved by the National Command Authority and President Harry Truman sent a copy to Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill.

⁷ Henry Kissinger, "The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War," Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, Simon & Shuster, 1994), 477. The U.S. involvement in Korean War subsequently salvaged the flagellating U.S. strategic plan known as NSC-68, dated 25 April 1950; a containment stratagem to overcome the communist (Soviet) expansionism with economic and military strength.

⁸ Ibid., 475-476.

⁹ Pedro Luis de la Fuente, "Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone, A Model for Regional Stability," Naval War College Review, Vol. L, No.1, winter 1997: 36-37. The practical

implementation of the transparent CBMs in Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the U.S. are credited for the end of the Cold War.

¹⁰ Jonathon Green, Comp., Morrow's International Dictionary of Contemporary Quotations, (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1982), 306.

¹¹ Park Tong Whan, "Issues of Arms Control Between the Two Koreas," Asian Survey, Vol. 32, Iss. 4, April 1992: 359.

¹² William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (White House, May 1997), ii.

¹³ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), 606.

¹⁴ Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1; Lee Wha Rang, "N Korean Nuclear Arsenal," 27 April 1996; available from <<http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/nk-nukes.htm>>; Internet; accessed 9 October 1998. The protection of American lives is a vital interest to the U.S. government and the North Korean's continuing development of the weapons of mass destruction is a grave concern to them. The North Korean nuclear weapons and the Taepo Dong ICBM production would imperil lives of not only the U.S. soldiers stationed in South Korea and Japan but the Americans in Alaska as well as the U.S. West Coast. As of 1996, North Korea is believed to have produced between 5 to 10 operational 50KT nuclear bombs and "two nuclear devices that can be carried by truck, boat or transport aircraft." Although the Agreed Framework suspended the Yongbyon nuclear reactor operation, there are three possible additional nuclear facilities, two in Taechon and one in Simpo.

¹⁵ Ibid, Clinton, 1.

¹⁶ Ibid., 23.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 24.

¹⁹ Ibid., 23-24.

²⁰ Eugene Ehrlich and Marshall De Bruhl, Comps., The International Thesaurus of Quotations, (New York, Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1996), 294.

²¹ Hwang, Jong-yop, the highest-ranking DPRK officials to defect in 1997 stated that DPRK is suffering serious internal problems. Prior to his defection to ROK, Mr. Hwang was in Japan attempting to secure food for North Korea.

²² William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (White House, February 1995), I.

²³ James J. Przystup, "The Second Anniversary of the U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Accord: Cause for Celebration?", linked from "The Heritage Foundation." available from <<http://www.national-security.org/he...library/categories/forpol/h1587.html>>; Internet; accessed 17 October 1997.

²⁴ Charles Kartman, "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea," linked from "Department of State," 26 February 1997; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/ea./970226_kartman_north_korea.html>; Internet; accessed 17 November 1997.

²⁵ Barbara Slavin, "MIA mission may unearth diplomacy," linked from "USA Today World." 22 October 1997, available from <http://167.8.29.8/plweb-cgi/idoc.p...AY_ONLINE+NEWS+++north%26korea>; Internet; accessed 23 October 1997.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Steve A. Fondacaro, "An Alternative Scenario for the Unification of Korea," US Army War College, Strategic Research Paper, (Carlisle, 1997), 23.

²⁸ Kim, Myong Chol, "Marshal Kim Jong Il's War Plan," 10 June 1996, available from <<http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/kim-war.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 September 1997. This source contains comments made by the Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea and Commander in Chief of the UNC and the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, Gary L. Luck, in reference to North Korea. He was quoted as testifying in the House of Representatives that the "question is not if this country (North Korea) will disintegrate, but how will it disintegrate, by implosion or explosion, and when." The possible North Korean demise scenario refers to the terms: absorption, implosion, and explosion. "Absorption" refers to a German style collapse; "implosion" to political failure; and "explosion" to and civilian unrest/possible war.

²⁹ KCNA, "Papers Hail Kim Jong Il's Election as General Secretary of WPK; 16 September 1997; available from <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/contents/09.htm#16>>; Internet; accessed 10 October 1997.

³⁰ Ehrlich, 110.

³¹ Bevin Alexander, Korea, the First War We Lost, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1969), 483; CDSP, JCS., ROK Force Improvement Program, Central Directorate for Strategic Planning, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Republic of Korea, (Seoul: Byum-Sin Sa Co., 1994), I, 6-7.

³² Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, 16th ed. (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1996), 48, 50. The U.S. Army Fifth Corps in Europe authorized strength of about 41,000 personnel is budgeted for \$207 million a year.

³³ Ehrlich, 595.

³⁴ Robert A. Manning, "Diplomatic Hiatus in the Korean Endgame: Time to Step Back and Reassess Next Steps," available from <<http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/index.html>>; Internet; accessed 14 October 1997.

³⁵ Kyongsoo, Lho , "Korea's Foreign Policy: United States, China, and the Korean Peninsula," Focus on Korea, Asian Perspectives Series, The Asia Foundation, report with a letter dated 11 December 1997.

³⁶ Jeffrey R. Smith, "U.S. Aides Pessimistic on Korea Talk, The Washington Post, 13 October 1997, p. A24.

³⁷ Kang, Young Ho, "Geneva Four-Way Talks Disappoints DPRK with No Discussion of US Military Presence," 17 December 1997; available from <<http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/PK%2022th%20issue/97121704.htm>>; Internet; accessed 6 January 1998.

³⁸ "DPRK Propose Bilateral Talks to U.S. on Peace Treaty (March 25, 1974)," linked from Selected Disarmament Policy of DPRK (1971-1996), available from <<http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/PK16th%20issue/Disarmament/disarm.htm>>; Internet; accessed 7 January 1998.

³⁹ David I. Steinberg, "An Inquiry into Contemporary Korea in Historical Perspective," Korea: Nexus of East Asia, (New York: American-Asian Educational Exchange, 1969), 1-8.

⁴⁰ Webster's Compact Dictionary of Quotations, (Springfield, Massachusetts, Merriam-Webster Inc., 1992), 84.

⁴¹ "North Korea Says U.S. Must Provide Food Aid," linked from Reuters Headlines, available from <http://www.pathfinder.com/>

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⁴² Barbara Slavin, "MIA Mission May Unearth Diplomacy," linked from "USA Today World." 22 October 1997, available from <http://167.8.29.8/plweb-cgi/idoc.p...AY_ONLINE+NEWS+++north%26korea>; Internet; accessed 23 October 1997.

⁴³ The People's Korea, "Formal Ending of Korean War is Crucial to DPRK-US Rapprochement," linked from The People's Korea, available from <<http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/PK%2025th%issue/98010502.htm>>; Internet; accessed 22 January 1998.

⁴⁴ Selig S. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," Foreign Policy, no. 106 (Spring 1997): 70-71.

⁴⁵ Stanly O. Roth, "Scenarios for Ensuring Growth and Stability in East Asia," linked from "Department of State," 15 October 1997; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/971015_roth_asia-pac1.html>, Internet. Accessed 18 November 1997.

⁴⁶ Erlich, 110.

⁴⁷ KCNA, "The New York Times Praises G.S. Kim Jong Il," 31 December 1997; available from <<http://www.kcna.co.jp./item/9712/news12/31.htm#1>>, Internet. Accessed 5 January 1998. Kim Jong Il stated, "We have no intention to regard the United States as our eternal sworn enemy, we hope to normalize the Korea-US relationship." KCNA, "Secretary Kim Jong Il On Tasks and Ways to Improve Inter-Korean relations and Achieve Reunification," 13 August 1997; available from <<http://www.kcna.co.jp./item/9708/news8/13.htm#1>>, Internet. Accessed 10 October 1997. Kim Jong Il's statement indicates his desire to normalize relations with the U.S.: "We do not want to regard the U.S. as an inveterate enemy but hope for normalized relations between the DPRK and the U.S."

⁴⁸ Green, 320.

⁴⁹ Perry, 65.

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